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Management of electronics supply chains has become increasingly complicated 
due to both a rising dependence on Contract Electronics Manufacturers (CEMs) 
and the increased dominance of retailing giants. This paper analyzes the effects 
of different leadership structures on the relative profit of each member of a 
three-tier electronics supply chain that consists of a CEM, an Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), and a Retailer. Our decentralized supply chain 
setting is governed by a wholesale price contract, and we assume that each 
supply chain member faces an increasing marginal unit cost function. We 
conduct a comparative analysis with a centralized supply chain (i.e., a vertically 
integrated company with business divisions acting as CEM, OEM, and Retailer). 
Three different demand functions are considered: linear, exponential, and 
stochastic. Our results show that supply chains in which the Retailer acts as the 
Stackelberg leader have the highest optimum profit regardless of the demand 
function. Results also show that the allocation of unit cost between the CEM, 
OEM and Retailer affects the profit distribution profile. Finally, we also study the 
effectiveness of demand disruption management in the decentralized supply 
chain setting where the OEM is the leader. A penalty cost is incurred by the 
Retailer when a demand disruption occurs, i.e. when actual demand deviates 
from the original forecast. We find exact analytical solutions of the effectiveness 
of managing disruptions when the consumer demand is linear, and we provide 







Fueled by the technology recession in 2000-2001, the global electronics supply 
chain has been fundamentally altered by the rise of Contract Electronics 
Manufacturers (CEMs). Until a few years ago, Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM) such as IBM and Motorola used in-house facilities to 
manufacture most major sub-assemblies for their end products.  They provided 
sub-assemblies to internal business units and also sold them in the 
marketplace. For example, hard disk drives manufactured by IBM‟s Storage 
System Division were sold to OEMs, consumers, distributors, and were used in 
other IBM products such as personal computers and servers. In such a 
vertically integrated supply chain, IBM had complete visibility of all of its 
component suppliers and exercised near total control of operations. Of course, 
operating electronics supply chains has never been easy, and even in a 
vertically integrated supply chain, the issue of centralized versus decentralized 
supply chain decision making can be contentious.   
 
Recently the IBM Institute of Business Value (2008) reported that CEOs in the 
electronics industry are striving for global integration to a much greater extent 
than their peers in other industries. Global integration aims to build the supply 




executing their particular task, which can be a very challenging endeavor.  
Unlike the days of vertical integration, these nodes do not have to be owned by 
one firm and can be situated anywhere in the world.  
 
Consider Apple‟s first generation iPod Nano. Apple (OEM) outsourced 
production of the Nano to Foxconn Technology Group (CEM) who assembled 
over one hundred components. One of the key components on this first 
generation was the PortalPlayer microchip, which was built by the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC) and United Microelectronics Corp. 
(UMC). After a very long, complex manufacturing process involving hundreds of 
steps and extraordinarily expensive machinery, the chips were coated in plastic 
and made ready for assembly by Silicon-Ware in Taiwan and Amkor in Korea. 
The finished microchip was then warehoused in Hong Kong before being 
transported to China where the Nanos were assembled by Foxconn. 
 
Carbone (2004) wrote that market researcher iSuppli predicted that the global 
contract electronics manufacturing (CEM) industry will experience a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 11.1 per cent from about $159 billion in 2003 to 
$307 billion in 2008. However, iSuppli also reported in an article “CEM Industry 
to Transform by 2013” published by EMT WorldWide (2008) that the CEM 




expected to rise at a CAGR of 7.2% from $305.5 billion in 2007 to $432.3 billion 
in 2012. The latest development in this consolidation trend was the $3.6 billion 
acquisition of Solectron by Flextronics in October 2007. Flextronics now has the 
broadest worldwide electronics manufacturing services capabilities in the 
electronics outsourcing industry. For OEM buyers involved in outsourcing 
decision, this means less competition for manufacturing business. 
 
iSuppli further reported that the CEMs are reexamining their relationships with 
their OEM consumers. Conflicts between OEMs and CEMs over decisions 
regarding which component suppliers to work with and which parts to buy have 
become common nowadays. There is a wide range of potential engagement 
models between OEM and their CEMs that vary between fully outsourced 
models and total-control models. In a fully outsourced model, the CEM is 
responsible for most supply chain activities. On the other hand, in a total control 
model, the OEM retains control of most supply chain activities except for the 
actual manufacturing. Often, hybrid models that are a mix of the fully 
outsourced and total-control strategies have been developed to suit the unique 
manufacturing and service needs of the OEM.  
 
While the OEMs are still searching for the “winning model” in their relationship 




retailers and manufacturers of consumer products. Wang & Liu (2007) reported 
that the retailers in China consumer electronics hold a dominant position such 
that they are able to affect their supplier‟s production and delivery decisions. To 
gain greater market shares, the retailers squeeze the manufacturers by setting 
an even lower wholesale price – that means manufacturers need to sacrifice 
some profit in exchange of market share.  
 
Given these complexities, OEMs often find themselves confused and ask „who 
controls the supply chain?‟ and „what the right engagement model is?‟ Ericsson 
(OEM), for example, sources the entire manufacturing of the cell phones from 
Flextronics (CEM), and sells through Retailers like Best Buy, Radio Shack, 
Office Depot, and Wal-Mart. 
 
In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of leadership on a single-period, 
three-tier decentralized electronics supply chain that consists of a Contract 
Electronics Manufacturer (CEM), an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), 
and a Retailer (Figure 1).  We consider the two most commonly used functional 
relationship in demand studies, i.e. the linear and the exponential demand 
functions. We apply game-theory concepts to try to explain the results of 
interactions between the CEM, the OEM and the Retailer. Specifically, we apply 




that the leader, occupying the higher level of hierarchy, can choose his strategy 
to optimize his operation by taking into account the rational reactions of 
followers. We formulate a model with a serial supply chain governed by a 
simple wholesale price contract. We consider the contract sequence as a proxy 
for the relative power of the supply chain member. 
 
 
Figure 1 Three-tier electronics supply chain. 
 
To reflect the volatility of the electronics industry, we also consider a stochastic 
demand function in a two-period newsvendor supply chain setting. We apply 
two-period stochastic programming with recourse model. In the first period, a 
production plan is created based on a forecast of market demand that 
decreases linearly with price and is used for purposes such as procurement of 
raw materials and capacity planning. In the second period, the product is sold in 
the retail market and the actual market demand is known. The difference 
between the actual consumer demand faced by the Retailer and the initial 
forecast given to the OEM and CEM is defined as demand disruption. 
 
Finally, we study the impact of the demand disruption management in a two-
period, three-tier decentralized electronics supply chain that consists of a CEM, 




a powerful OEM, and a Retailer. The concept of disruption management was 
introduced by Yu (1998) in the context of airline equipment and crew 
rescheduling problems that occur when unexpected events create schedule 
disruptions. Disruption management is concerned with minimizing the impact of 
the disruption once the disruptive event has occurred. When actual consumer 
demand is higher than the forecast (positive disruption), overtime production 
and expedited delivery are required. On the other hand, when actual demand is 
lower than the forecast (negative disruption), costs for holding excess inventory 
and perhaps disposal are incurred. A cost-effective response to a demand 
disruption generally must consider the cost of deviating from existing production 
plans. The earliest publication on disruption management in a supply chain 
context is by Qi et al. (2004). 
 
The demand disruption can be generalized as a multi-tier two-period extension 
of the classical newsvendor problem. In contrast to the single-period 
newsvendor problem, decision makers in the multi-tier two-period problem use 
the demand information obtained in the first period to refine their decisions 
during the second period. Donohue (2000), for example, writes that this 
updated demand information for fashion goods can be gathered from trade 
shows, marketing research, etc. She does not use the term “demand disruption” 
in her two-period manufacturer-distributor newsvendor model. In contrast, Xia et 




are often caused by promotional sales. An extensive literature review on 
various extensions of the classical newsvendor problem can be found in Khouja 
(1999) and Petruzzi and Dada (1999). 
 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. We investigate the 
effect of different leadership in a three-tier supply chain with a CEM, an OEM, 
and a Retailer, while most papers to date consider a two-tier supply chain with a 
manufacturer and a retailer. Our three-tier model corresponds to what we see in 
practical world. The supply chains of the global electronics industry have 
steadily disaggregated - OEMs that formerly manufactured most products in-
house (such as IBM and Hewlett Packard) have outsourced production to 
CEMs, while at the same time major consumer electronics retailers (such as 
Best Buy) reportedly uses its power to buy products at the lowest cost possible 
and pass the gains on to the consumer through extremely low prices. We 
consider increasing marginal unit cost in our model to reflect the volatility nature 
of the electronics supply chain while others consider fixed unit cost. We show 
the impact of the demand randomness (as additive disruption in the linear 
demand function) to the optimum supply chain profit. We show the impact of 
unit cost distribution among the supply chain members on the overall supply 
chain profit under different leadership. We also investigate the demand 
disruption management in a three-tier supply chain with a CEM, a powerful 




with one manufacturer and one or many retailer(s). We find the exact analytical 
solutions of the effectiveness of managing the disruption when the consumer 
demand function is linear, and we provide numerical examples as an illustration 
when the consumer demand function is either linear or exponential. We show 
that the production plan for the exponential demand case is more robust relative 
to the linear demand case. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines relevant 
literature on supply chain contracts, leadership structure, and demand 
disruption. Section 3 defines our supply chain model for both the centralized 
and decentralized cases. Section 4 examines the impact of different leadership 
when consumer demand decreases linearly in price, section 5 examines impact 
when demand decreases exponentially in price, and section 6 examines impact 
when demand is stochastic. In section 7 we examine the methods to manage 
the supply chain when there is a disruption to the original demand function 
(linear and exponential). We include in section 4, 5, 6 and 7 the use of 
numerical approach to study the supply chain optimal decisions and profits, and 
we explore how the retail price, wholesale prices, and profits are affected by 
changes in the leadership structure (section 4, 5, an 6) and by changes in the 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In many instances in the supply chain literature, Stackelberg games have been 
applied to inventory and production issues, wholesale and retail pricing 
strategies, and outsourcing. The players in these non-cooperative supply chain 
settings are primarily concerned with optimizing their own objectives. When 
these objectives are uncoordinated, the supply chain as a whole encounters a 
significant loss of efficiency. Optimal performance can be achieved only if each 
supply chain member‟s objective becomes aligned with the supply chain‟s 
objective. A number of authors have studied mechanisms to achieve supply 
chain coordination under different Stackelberg leadership. Most of these 
papers, however, focus on the upstream firm (for example, the manufacturer or 
the supplier) dominance over the typically smaller downstream firm (the 
retailer). 
 
Lariviere & Porteus (2001) propose a simple contract with a wholesale price as 
the only contract parameter. They examine a single-period model in which a 
manufacturer sells a single product to a retailer facing uncertain demand. The 
manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader by offering a wholesale price 




to order from the manufacturer and at what price he will sell in order to 
maximize his profit. 
 
Jeuland and Shugan (1983) show that the decisions of each member in a 
distribution channel do affect the other channel members‟ profits and actions. In 
the simple manufacturer-retailer channel, uncoordinated and independent 
channel members‟ decisions over profit margins results in higher price to the 
end consumer, which leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the 
retailer. They show that the supplier can use a quantity discount schedule to 
induce the retailer to choose the channel-optimal retailing price.  
 
Ertek & Griffin (2002) develop and analyze two cases wherein each the supplier 
and the buyer has dominant bargaining power. Due to the increased computing 
power and internet access, consumers now have access to much more 
information including price, quality and service features of several competing 
products, thus increases their bargaining position when acquiring goods and 
services. On the other hand, if the number of suppliers is limited or reduced 
through consolidation, then a supplier‟s bargaining position is increased. In their 
model, the buyer operates under a simple deterministic EOQ model and sets 
the retail price while the supplier sets the wholesale price and determines 




case is achieved when the buyer uses only a multiplier (of the wholesale price) 
to determine the markup.  
 
Viswanathan and Wang (2003) study the effectiveness of namely volume 
discount and quantity discount contracts as coordination mechanisms in 
distribution channel with the vendor acting as the Stackelberg leader and the 
retailer acting as the follower.  
 
Choi (1991) investigates a channel structure with two competing manufacturers 
and one retailer that sells both manufacturers‟ products.  Three non-cooperative 
games of different leadership structures between the two manufacturers and 
the retailer are considered, i.e. Manufacturer Stackelberg, Nash Equilibrium, 
and Retailer Stackelberg.  
 
Zhao and Wang (2002) investigate a distribution channel consisting of a 
manufacturer who outsources her production distribution/retailing function to an 
independent downstream distributor/retailer. Both manufacturer and distributor 
face increasing production/ordering costs and incur a linear inventory holding 
cost. The demand at the distributor is deterministic and price-sensitive. They 




both parties to adopt channel-optimal policies. The manufacturer has complete 
information about distributor‟s cost parameters and demand function that 
represents its dominant power over the distributor. 
 
Gerchak and Wang (2004) extend the previous model to include multiple 
suppliers who each provide different (complementary) components in an 
assembly setting. They show that the supply chain performs better under a 
revenue sharing contract than under a wholesale price contract. In this setting 
the supplier who delivers the fewest components determines the quantity of the 
finished product that can be assembled, leaving a surplus of components from 
the other suppliers. In anticipation of this, each supplier will act strategically to 
minimize the impact on its profits caused by such a surplus of components. 
 
Such opportunistic behavior by each member of the supply chain can lead to 
disastrous financial results especially in the electronics industry. Hewlett 
Packard, for example, received inflated forecasts from retailers, which led to 
excess production capacity and excess inventory of their LaserJet printers in 
the 1990s. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) propose two types of compliance 
regimes: (1) forced compliance, where the supplier is forced to install a given 
capacity in advance (once he accepts a contract from the manufacturer) and (2) 




will maximize their expected profit. In their model, they consider a manufacturer 
who sells a single product with uncertain demand. The manufacturer contracts 
with a single supplier, who must install a certain capacity level before the actual 
demand is observed. A final order will be submitted by the manufacturer once 
the demand is realized. They show that the compliance regime plays an 
important role in the supply chain performance. 
 
Donohue (2000) studies a one-manufacturer one-distributor supply chain model 
for high-fashion, seasonal products. Similar to Cachon and Lariviere‟s work, two 
periods are considered. In the first period, the distributor places an order to the 
manufacturer based on uncertain demand predictions and a large range of 
possible demand scenarios. In the second period, more current market 
information is available and the distributor updates its forecast. The 
manufacturer produces items over the two periods, but the orders are filled in 
one shipment before the selling season begins. Donohue shows that there 
exists a two-tier wholesale pricing scheme with buyback contract that 
coordinates the supply chain and maximizes the total profit. Forced compliance 
is assumed in this study. 
 
In our study, we use a very similar three-tier supply chain model used by 




(2001) consider constant demand and the objective is to minimize cost. Ding & 
Chen (2008) consider positive stochastic demand and the objective is to 
maximize profit. Our work considers price-sensitive demand and the objective is 
to maximize profit. Our decentralized supply chain model is governed by a 
wholesale price contract with forced compliance while they use a quantity 
discount contract as the coordination mechanism. Cachon (2003) notes that 
although a wholesale price contract is generally not considered a coordinating 
contract, it is worth studying because it is commonly used in practice in part due 
to its simplicity. For example, a supplier may prefer a wholesale price contract 
over a different coordinating contract if the additional administrative burden 
associated with the coordinating contract exceeds the supplier‟s potential profit 
increase.   
 
Our study in the demand disruption is closely related to the work of Qi et al. 
(2004). They examine the impact of demand disruption in a two-period one-
supplier one-retailer supply chain model. In the first period, a production plan is 
developed before the demand is known. In the second period, the product is 
sold in the retail market after making adjustment to the original production plan. 
They show that under certain wholesale quantity discount policies (with the 
supplier as Stackelberg leader), the demand disruption can be managed 
leaving both the supplier and the retailer better off. Xu et al. (2006) study a 




These two studies consider a two-tier supply chain, while our work considers 
three-tier supply chain with increasing unit cost. Table 1 summarizes the 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. THE BASIC MODEL OF A SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
In our three-tier electronics supply chain, the CEM manufactures a single 
product and sells to the OEM who adds further value to the product and sells to 
the Retailer, who sells to the consumer market after incurring some marketing 
expenses as well as operating costs (rent, utilities, labor, etc.) The product lead 
time is deterministic, and without loss of generality is assumed to be zero. 
 
Due to the volatile nature of the electronics supply chain, we assume that each 
supply chain member faces an increasing marginal unit cost function. As the 
consumer demand increases, the demand for components and the resources to 
produce also increases. These components and resources (such as the 
assembly line) are specific to electronics industry, meaning additional 
investment is needed to increase output (capacity). However, the component 
manufacturers have always been reluctant to make a large investment in 
capacity expansion because the machinery and the equipment may be 
technologically obsolete within a few years. The demand and supply imbalance 
eventually leads electronics industry to a seller‟s market. Banker et al. (1998) 
and Eliashberg & Steinberg (1993) provide a good discussion on the usage of 





A decreasing marginal unit cost function applies to many retail industries. 
Consumers can obtain quantity discounts by purchasing materials and supplies 
in bulk through warehouse clubs such as Sam‟s Club and Costco. A linear cost 
function (constant marginal cost function) applies to the software industry. The 
fixed costs of developing an operating system, for example, can be very high, 
but the costs of producing one extra copy are practically zero. 
 
We assume no finished goods inventory exists at any member of the supply 
chain at the beginning of the first period. Production lead-times at CEM and 
ordering/processing lead-times at OEM/Retailer are zero. Consumer market 
demand is satisfied in its entirety and no quantity is leftover in the supply chain 





3.1 Model of a Supply Chain with Deterministic Demand 
Function 
 
We first study the impact of leadership in the two-period supply chain where the 
consumer demand is deterministic and price dependent. As a benchmark, we 
first consider a model where the CEM, OEM, and the Retailer are owned by one 
firm (see Figure 2). The product unit cost is  where  is the marginal 
cost coefficient. In the first period, a production plan  is created based on a 
forecast market demand  and is used for purposes such as procurement of 
raw materials and capacity planning. In the second period, the product is sold in 
the retail market at retail price  and the actual market demand is known and 
matches the initial forecast . We consider the two most commonly used 
mathematical functions for representing a downward-sloping price  versus 
demand  relationship: (1) linear  and (2) exponential 
. In the linear demand function,  is the market scale (i.e. the maximum 
possible demand),  is the price-sensitive coefficient, and . In 
the exponential demand function,  is also the market scale,  is the demand 
elasticity, and . While the linear demand function is mathematically 






Figure 2 Centralized supply chain model with deterministic demand function.  
 
The centralized supply chain owner maximizes the expected profit  by setting 
the retail price  to the value obtained from the following optimization problem: 
    (1) 
 
Differentiating with respect to retail price , we obtain as necessary and 
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To investigate the impact of different leadership in the decentralized model 
shown in Figure 3, we construct the effective demand and the cost function that 
each supply chain member faces as a result of the successive offering of 
contracts. The supply chain member with more bargaining power, thus the 
Stackelberg leader, offers a contract in terms of a wholesale price. The supply 
chain member with less bargaining power (the follower) would have to react to 
the leader‟s contract offer by deciding the quantity.  
 
In the first period, the Retailer forecasts to OEM an order quantity  based on 
the forecast market demand . The OEM, in turn, informs the CEM the intent to 
order quantity . Accordingly, the CEM creates a production plan of quantity 
. The actual market demand is realized in the second period, and in the 
deterministic case, it equals to the forecast . The Retailer buys the product 
from the OEM at a certain unit wholesale price  and incurs unit cost (includes 
advertisement cost, setup and ordering cost, etc.) of , where  is the 






Figure 3 Decentralized supply chain model with deterministic demand 
function. 
 
The OEM buys the product from the CEM at a certain unit wholesale price  
and incurs unit cost (includes setup cost and ordering cost, final assembly and 
test cost) of , where  is the marginal unit cost coefficient at the OEM. 
The CEM manufactures the product at unit cost (includes material cost and 
labor and load) of , where  is the marginal unit cost coefficient at the 




























































there is no leftover quantity in the supply chain at the end of the second period, 
we have . 
 
The objective function of each supply chain member in the decentralized model 
is to maximize its own profit. By applying the first and second-order conditions 
from equations (2) and (3), we obtain the optimal quantity solution of the entire 
supply chain.  We then can calculate the offered wholesale prices and the 
maximum supply chain profit.  
 
Depending on the situation, the bargaining power possessed by each supply 
chain member can vary significantly. Three scenarios are considered in our 
study: 
1. The Retailer has more bargaining power than the OEM and the CEM, 
and thus is the Stackelberg leader. This scenario arises in markets 
where the Retailers‟ sizes are large. For example, large retailers like 
Best Buys and Wal-Mart can decide their margin on sales and offer a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” contract to the OEM that specifies an amount of 
money (unit wholesale price ) they are willing to spend on the product. 
The OEM accepts the contract by deciding the quantity . Towards the 
CEM, the OEM sets the unit wholesale price   and the CEM decides 





2. The OEM has more bargaining power than the CEM and the Retailer, 
and thus is the Stackelberg leader. The OEM sets the wholesale price 
 to the CEM as well as  to the Retailer. The CEM decides the 
production quantity , and the Retailer decides the order quantity  
(hence, the retail price ). This scenario arises in markets where the 
demand of the OEM‟s product exceeds the supply. For example, the 
initial demand for Apple‟s iPod Nano was very high (the first million units 
sold in only 17 days) and some consumers had to wait weeks before 
they could get the product. At the same time, the technology to build 
these products is not complicated, and an OEM with brand recognition 
(e.g., Apple) can easily move the manufacturing process from one CEM 
(e.g., Foxconn or Asustek Computer) to another. Thus, Apple has the 
bargaining power. The consumers respond to the Apple brand and not to 
the big box retailer or to the unnamed factories making the products. The 
OEM seeks to maximize its margin on sales while squeezing profit from 
its suppliers (CEMs) and also from Retailers. Suppliers are mostly 
concerned with obtaining orders from the OEMs, and the Retailers are 
mostly concerned with stockouts.  
 
3. The CEM has more bargaining power than the OEM and the Retailer, 
and thus is the Stackelberg leader. The CEM offers the wholesale price 
 to the OEM, and the OEM decides the order quantity  The OEM, in 




quantity  (hence, the retail price ).  An example of this scenario is 
where the transfer of the production process and technology as well as 
the supply chains to another CEM or back in-house is very costly. Up to 
80% of worldwide tablet PC shipments (such as Apple‟s iPad, Amazon‟s 
Kindle, and Barnes & Nobel‟s Nook) are manufactured by Foxconn. It will 
be extremely hard for the OEMs to switch from Foxconn, given the 
complexity of reworking assembly lines and supply chains. 
 
We assume all supply chain members possess the complete information when 
making their decisions. In the third scenario, for example, the CEM knows the 
OEM‟s response (order quantity ) for a given wholesale price offered ( ), 
hence, the resulting profit. Taking this information into account, the CEM will 

































































3.2 Model of a Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand Function 
 
We also study the impact of leadership in the supply chain with stochastic 
consumer market demand. This situation arises where the actual market demand 
differs with the initial forecast. We apply a two-stage (two-period) stochastic 
programming with recourse model pioneered by Dantzig (1955). In this model, 
the decisions and constraints of the supply chain are classified into two sets. In 
the first period, a production plan of quantity  is created based on the forecast 
that the consumer demand decreases linearly with price. In the second period, 
the actual market demand  is realized. The difference between the actual 
market demand and the initial forecast is termed demand disruption. If , 
additional production needs to be planned to meet the unplanned demand 
. Normally this additional production requires the use of more expensive 
resources (for example, higher cost of overtime production and premium 
transportation to bring the product to the consumers). On the other hand, if the 
actual demand is less than the quantity produced , the supply chain may 
incur inventory carrying cost, order cancellation cost, etc. or may have to dispose 
or sell leftover inventory (in the form of final product or work-in-process) to a 
secondary market, usually at a lower price. In either case, the demand disruption 






Figure 5 Decentralized supply chain model with stochastic demand function. 
 
The actual demand quantity  is different from the original forecast . The 
Retailer purchases from the OEM new quantity  who in turn purchases from the 
CEM quantity . The CEM new production plan is . Since there is no quantity 
leftover in the supply chain, we have . We introduce   and   as 
the unit penalty cost of the increase and decrease of production from the original 
plan. Additional production requires more expensive resources such as overtime 
CEM

















































labor. In the case when actual demand is less than the initial plan, the supply 
chain may have to dispose or sell the leftover inventory to a secondary market. 
For simplicity, we will assume that only the Retailer carries the burden of financial 
risk of planning. In other words, inaccurate predictions of consumer market 
demand result in additional cost at the Retailer only. 
 
The principal notations are listed in Table 2. 






Actual consumer demand   
Unit retail price charged to the Consumers   
Unit wholesale price to the OEM   
Unit wholesale price to the Retailer   
Quantity produced by the CEM and supplied to the OEM   
Quantity ordered by the OEM and supplied to the Retailer   
Quantity ordered by the Retailer and supplied to the market   
Profit at the CEM   
Profit at the OEM   
Profit at the Retailer   







4. STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH 
LINEAR DEMAND FUNCTION 
 
In this section, we investigate the impact of different leadership when the 
consumer demand decreases linearly with price. We begin with the basic 
centralized firm model in section 4.1 followed by the decentralized model under 
different leadership in section 4.2 to 4.4. In section 4.5, we include the use of 
numerical approach to study the supply chain optimal decisions and profits under 
different leadership. We analyze the centralized supply chain as a baseline 
followed by the decentralized supply chain, using the changes in the supply chain 
profit to illustrate the effectiveness of each leadership structure.  We explore how 
the retail price, wholesale prices, and profits are affected by changes in the 
leadership structure. 
 
4.1 The Centralized Supply Chain 
 
The linear demand function is deterministic: 
     (4) 





Solving the first order condition in equation (2) will give the optimum price  
(and subsequently, the optimum quantity ) that maximizes the centralized 
supply chain profit : 
 




4.2 The Decentralized Supply Chain: Retailer Stackelberg 
 
The Retailer sets the unit retail price  and offer a contract to the OEM with unit 
wholesale price . The OEM accepts the contract and offers a contract to the 
CEM with unit wholesale price .  The CEM accepts the contract and 




. To maximize profit, we apply the first and second order conditions from 






The OEM profit function is  where is the 
OEM‟s operating cost. Substituting with equation (6) and applying conditions 
from equation (2) and (3), we get: 
    (7) 
The Retailer‟s profit function is . Substituting with 
equation (7) and applying conditions from equation (2) and (3), we can calculate 








The total supply chain optimum profit is the sum of the optimum profit at each 








4.3 The Decentralized Supply Chain: OEM Stackelberg 
 
The OEM sets the unit wholesale price contract  and  to maximize its profit. 
The CEM accepts the contract and determines its production quantity  
following equation (6). The Retailer accepts the contract and decides the order 
quantity . The profit function at the Retailer is , 
where is the procurement cost to the OEM and is the Retailer‟s 
operating cost. To maximize Retailer‟s profit, we apply the conditions from 









The OEM profit function is .  To maximize OEM‟s 
profit, we apply the conditions from equations (2) and (3) and substitute  and 





The total supply chain optimum profit is the sum of the optimum profit at each 









     
 
4.4 The Decentralized Supply Chain: CEM Stackelberg 
 
The CEM offers a contract to the OEM with a unit wholesale price of . The 
OEM accepts the contract and in turn, offers the wholesale price  to the 
Retailer. From equations (6) and (10), we get      
 
Solving the first and second order condition the CEM profit function







             
The total supply chain optimum profit is the sum of the optimum profit at each 







The optimum parameters under different leadership when the demand function is 

















































































































































































4.5 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Optimal Decisions and 
Profits  
 
Suppose the demand function is characterized by the market scale  10000 
and the price-sensitive coefficient  1. Let the positive coefficient of the 
product marginal cost in the centralized supply chain is  1. The optimal 
demand quantity and the optimal retail price are  2500,  $7500 
respectively, and the maximum profit of the supply chain is  
$12,500,000. 
 
In the decentralized supply chain, the positive coefficient of the marginal cost is 
“distributed” to each member of the supply chain. ABI Research released a report 
in 2007 stating that the total cost for the bill of materials can be multiplied by 2 or 
2.5 in order to derive the approximate final price of cellular handset. The 
multiplicative factor accounts for the costs of distribution, advertising, and 
marketing. Based on this report, we allocate 50% of the marginal cost to the 






When the Retailer has more power in the supply chain and acts as the leader, we 
calculate using results from section 4.2 the optimal demand quantity = 1299 
and the optimal retail price = $8701 respectively, and the maximum profit of 
the supply chain is = $9,613,763 or 77% of the optimum profit of the 
centralized supply chain. The profit distribution is as follow: at the CEM  = 
$843,313 (9%), at the OEM  = $2,276,944 (24%), and at the Retailer  = 
$6,493,506 (68%). 
 
Following the results from section 4.3 with the OEM as the leader, we calculate 
the optimal demand quantity is  = 1370 and the optimal retail price is = 
$8630. The optimum total supply chain profit is = $9,945,581 which is 80% 
of the optimum profit of the centralized supply chain. The CEM profit is  = 
$938,262, the OEM  = $6,849,315 , and the Retailer  = $2,158,003. We 
see that OEM, being the leader, experienced most of the profit (69%), followed 
by the Retailer (22%) and the CEM (9%). 
 
When CEM is the leader, we find using results from section 4.4 that the optimal 
demand quantity and the optimal retail price are  862 and  $9138 
respectively. The optimum total supply chain profit is  $7,134,364. Let  
be the coefficient of efficiency of the decentralized supply chain, as defined by 




led supply chain is 57% of the centralized supply chain with the same demand 
parameters. At the CEM, the profit is   $4,310,345 , the OEM  
$1,969,382 , and the Retailer  $854,637. We see that CEM, being the 
leader, experienced most of the profit (60%) followed by the OEM (28%) and the 
Retailer (12%). 
 
The results above are tabulated in table 4 and are consistent with the 
observation that most decentralized supply chains derive less profit than their 
corresponding centralized supply chain. The supply chain leader experienced the 
most of the profit, followed by the next upstream/downstream member of the 
supply chain. The leadership structure in the decentralized supply chain has a 
significant impact on the retail price.  While the end consumer must spend much 
more in the CEM-led model, the total supply chain profit is actually the least 
relative to the OEM- and Retailer-led model. The profit efficiency in the OEM 
Stackelberg is slightly higher than the Retailer Stackelberg. The end consumer 
may not notice the difference of the supply chain leadership structure because 
the two retail prices are very close. Compared to the centralized supply chain as 
the baseline, the lowest retail price (in the OEM Stackelberg) is 15% higher, and 






Table 4 Effect of different leadership structure on optimum parameters and 










   
4.6 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Effect of Cost 
Distribution on Optimum Profit under Different Leadership  
 
We normalize the cost coefficient  such that   = 1. The 
cost coefficient now represents the cost distribution between CEM, 




CEM leads OEM leads 
Retailer 
leads 
 2500 862 1370 1299 
  $5431 $1370 $1299 
  $8017 $6849 $3506 






















 $12,500,000 $7,134,364 $9,945,581 $9,613,763 
η 100% 57% 80% 77% 




cost at CEM cannot be less than 5% of the total cost, or   0.05. We 
investigate two extreme cases: 
  0, meaning that the unit cost at the OEM is insignificant relative to 
the unit cost at the CEM and Retailer. Example of this case is where the 
finish products are shipped directly from the CEM to the Retailer (direct 
fulfillment mode) and the Retailer bears all the marketing expenses. 
  0, meaning that the unit cost at the Retailer is insignificant relative to 
the unit cost at the CEM and OEM. Example of this case is where the 
OEM subsidized the marketing expenses of the Retailer.  
 
 
Figure 6 Effect of increasing CEM‟s marginal cost coefficient on the profit 
efficiency under different leadership with linear demand function, where the unit 
cost is allocated to CEM and Retailer only.  
 
From Figure 6, we see that when all the costs are allocated to the CEM and the 
Retailer only, the optimum profit in the OEM Stackelberg supply chain is not 
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Retailer). The optimum profit in CEM Stackelberg supply chain increases linearly 
but still lower than the optimum profit in OEM Stackelberg. The maximum profit 
efficiency is 99.51% in Retailer Stackelberg supply chain when the CEM unit cost 
is at its minimum (  = 0.05) and the Retailer unit cost is at its maximum (  = 
0.95).  The Retailer Stackelberg‟s optimum profit decreases linearly as  
increases ( decreases) at a rate faster than the rate of increase of the 
optimum profit of the CEM Stackelberg. The optimum profit of the OEM and 
Retailer Stackelberg intersects at  = 0.667 (75% efficiency), which means that 
the maximum profit efficiency is 75% regardless of whether the OEM or the 
Retailer leads when the CEM bears 2/3 of the total unit cost. 
 
Figure 7 Effect of increasing CEM‟s marginal cost coefficient on the profit 
efficiency under different leadership with linear demand function, where the unit 
cost is allocated to CEM and OEM only.  
 
From Figure 7, we see that when all the costs are allocated to the CEM and the 
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decrease linearly with the increasing unit cost at the CEM (and decreasing unit 
cost at the Retailer); the rate of the decrease is higher in the Retailer 
Stackelberg. The optimum profit in the CEM Stackelberg supply chain increases 
linearly but still lower than the optimum profit in the OEM and Retailer 
Stackelberg. The maximum profit efficiency of 88.15% is achieved when the 
OEM is the leader and the CEM cost is at its minimum ( = 0.05) and the OEM 
cost is at its maximum ( = 0.95). 
 
Figure 8 shows the leadership that will achieve highest optimum profit efficiency 
in our model. The Retailer Stackelberg supply chain has the most optimum profit 
efficiency when the unit cost is allocated to the CEM and the Retailer only 
(  = 1;  = 0) up until the CEM unit cost is at 50% (at this point, 
 = 0.5).  When the CEM unit cost is more than 50% of the overall unit cost, the 
highest optimum profit efficiency is achieved when the powerful OEM leads the 
supply chain and the unit cost is allocated to the CEM and the OEM only 










4.7 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Effect of Cost 
Distribution on Supply Chain Member’s Profit under 
Different Leadership  
 
We investigate the effect of the unit cost to the profit distribution of the supply 
chain members. We plot in Figure 9 the profit distribution in the CEM Stackelberg 
supply chain relative to the CEM unit cost. The CEM profit is at its lowest (57%-
60%) when its unit cost is 5% of the overall supply chain unit cost. The CEM 
profit rises slightly when more of the supply chain cost is absorbed by the CEM, 
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allocated to the CEM. The OEM profit is higher than the Retailer regardless of 
the unit cost distribution. 
 
Figure 9 Effect of CEM unit cost to the profit distribution in a CEM Stackelberg 
supply chain with linear demand function. 
 
In Figure 10, we plot the profit distribution in the OEM Stackelberg relative to the 
OEM unit cost. The lowest OEM profit is at 67% of the total supply chain profit 
when the unit cost is shared only by the CEM and the Retailer. The OEM profit 
increases as more of the unit cost is absorbed, reaching its maximum at 74%. 
The OEM profit share is not affected by how the unit cost is distributed between 
the CEM and the Retailer. The Retailer profit is significantly higher than the CEM. 
 
The profit distribution in the Retailer Stackelberg relative to the Retailer unit cost 
is shown in Figure 11. The lowest Retailer profit is at 63%-74% of the total supply 




























Figure 10 Effect of OEM unit cost to the profit distribution in an OEM 




Figure 11 Effect of Retailer unit cost to the profit distribution in a Retailer 












































5. STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH 
EXPONENTIAL DEMAND FUNCTION 
  
Using the same methodologies as in section 4, we obtain the optimum 
parameters under different leadership when the demand function is exponential. 
The results are tabulated in Table 5. 
       
5.1 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Optimal Decisions and 
Profits  
 
Suppose the demand function is characterized by the market scale 
and the price-sensitive coefficient  Let the positive coefficient of the 
product marginal cost in the centralized supply chain is . The optimal 
demand quantity and the optimal retail price are = $3056 
















































































































































































As in the previous section for the decentralized supply chain, we allocate 50% of 
the marginal cost to the CEM, 35% to the OEM, and 15% to the Retailer, or 
 and . We calculate the optimum profit under 
different leadership by using the formula from table 5 and the results are 
tabulated in table below. 
 
Table 6 Effect of different leadership structure on optimum parameters and 





CEM leads OEM leads Retailer leads 
 1146 451 609 495 
  $1582 $610 $496 
  $2757 $2501 $1339 






















 $2,189,267 $1,538,853 $1,810,528 $1,622,715 
η 100% 70% 83% 74% 
 
 
The leadership structure in the decentralized supply chain with exponential 
demand has a more significant impact on the retail price than the one with linear 
demand. In the example above, the lowest retail price (in the OEM Stackelberg) 




higher. This is 2-4 points higher than the decentralized supply chain with linear 
demand. While the end consumer must spend more in the CEM-led model, the 
total supply chain profit is actually the least relative to the OEM- and Retailer-led 
model. The profit efficiency in the OEM Stackelberg is the highest, even though 
the retail price is the lowest among the three different leadership structures. 
 
       
5.2 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Effect of Cost 
Distribution on Optimum Profit under Different Leadership 
 
When all the costs are allocated to the CEM and the Retailer only, the optimum 
profit in the OEM Stackelberg supply chain is not affected by the increasing unit 
cost at the CEM (and decreasing unit cost at the Retailer). The optimum profit in 
CEM Stackelberg supply chain increases exponentially and surpasses the 
optimum profit in OEM Stackelberg when 84% of the unit cost is absorbed by the 
CEM. The maximum profit efficiency is 99.15% in Retailer Stackelberg supply 
chain when the CEM cost is at its minimum , and the Retailer cost is 
at its maximum . The Retailer Stackelberg‟s optimum profit 
decreases exponentially as  increases ( decreases) at a similar rate with the 
rate of increase of the optimum profit of the CEM Stackelberg. The optimum 
profit of the OEM and Retailer Stackelberg intersects at  (76% 




whether the OEM or the Retailer leads when the CEM bears ~57%  of the total 
unit cost.  Figure 11 shows the effect of CEM unit cost on the supply chain profit 
efficiency under different leadership when the OEM does not carry any unit cost. 
 
Figure 12 Effect of increasing CEM‟s marginal cost coefficient on the profit 
efficiency under different leadership with exponential demand function, where 
the unit cost is allocated to CEM and Retailer only.  
 
When all the costs are allocated to the CEM and the OEM only, the optimum 
profit in the OEM and Retailer Stackelberg supply chain decrease exponentially 
with the increasing unit cost at the CEM (and decreasing unit cost at the 
Retailer); the rate of the decrease is slightly higher in the Retailer Stackelberg. 
The optimum profit in the CEM Stackelberg supply chain increases exponentially 
and becomes the highest when 72% of the total unit cost is absorbed by the 
CEM ( ). The maximum profit efficiency of 95.73% is achieved when 
the OEM is the leader and the CEM cost is at its minimum and the 
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unit cost on the supply chain profit efficiency under different leadership when the 
Retailer does not carry any unit cost. 
 
Figure 13 Effect of increasing CEM‟s marginal cost coefficient on the profit 
efficiency under different leadership with exponential demand function, where 
the unit cost is allocated to CEM and OEM only.  
 
The highest optimum profit efficiency in our model is shown in Figure 14. The 
Retailer Stackelberg supply chain has the most optimum profit efficiency when 
the unit cost is allocated to the CEM and the Retailer only
, up until the CEM unit cost is at 20% (at this point, ).  
When the CEM unit cost is more than 20% but less than 71% of the overall unit 
cost, the highest optimum profit efficiency is achieved when the powerful OEM 
leads the supply chain. When the unit cost is more than 71% at the CEM, the 
CEM Stackelberg supply chain will have the highest optimum profit provided that 
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Figure 14 The highest optimum profit efficiency of the supply chain with 
exponential demand function. 
 
 
5.3 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Effect of Cost 
Distribution on Supply Chain Member’s Profit under 
Different Leadership  
 
We now investigate the effect of the unit cost to the profit distribution of the 
supply chain members. We plot in Figure 15 the profit distribution in the CEM 
Stackelberg supply chain relative to the CEM unit cost. The CEM profit is at its 
lowest (~37%) when its unit cost is 5% of the overall supply chain unit cost and 
rises when more of the supply chain cost is absorbed by the CEM, reaching its 
maximum at ~45% of the total supply chain profit when all unit cost is allocated to 
the CEM. Unlike in the Liner Demand situation, the OEM profit may be lower than 
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CEM accounts up to 58% of the total. When the CEM unit cost is 58% or more of 
the total unit cost, the OEM profit is lower than the Retailer. 
 
Figure 15 Effect of CEM unit cost to the profit distribution of each member in a 
CEM Stackelberg supply chain with exponential demand function. 
 
We plot the profit distribution in the OEM Stackelberg relative to the OEM unit 
cost In Figure 16. The lowest OEM profit is at 55% of the total supply chain profit 
when the unit cost is shared by the CEM and the Retailer. Similar to the Linear 
Demand situation, the OEM profit increases as more of the unit cost is absorbed, 
reaching its maximum at 64%. The OEM profit share is not affected by how the 
unit cost is distributed between the CEM and the Retailer. The Retailer profit is 
significantly higher than the CEM. 
 
The profit distribution in the Retailer Stackelberg relative to the Retailer unit cost 
is shown in Figure 17. The lowest Retailer profit is at 69-76% of the total supply 
chain profit when the unit cost is shared by the CEM and the OEM and it 
























93%. The profit distribution profile of the Retailer Stackelberg supply chain with 
exponential demand is almost identical to the one with linear demand in Figure 
11. 
 
Figure 16 Effect of OEM unit cost to the profit distribution of each member in an 
OEM Stackelberg supply chain with exponential demand function. 
 
 
Figure 17 Effect of Retailer unit cost to the profit distribution in a Retailer 














































6. STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH 
STOCHASTIC DEMAND FUNCTION 
 
The linear and exponential demand functions in sections 4 and 5 assume that the 
supply chain has perfect information about the consumer demand. However, 
perfect market information is rarely available in practice. In this section, we 
investigate the impact of different leadership when the consumer demand is 
stochastic using the two-stage stochastic programming with recourse model. The 
randomness in demand is price independent and can be modeled in an additive 
form (Mills 1959). In the first period, the production plan is created based on the 
demand forecast . The actual demand realized in the second period is : 
  (16) 
where is assumed to be a normally distributed random variable.  
represents an increased market demand, and represents a decreased 
market demand. The Retailer purchases from the OEM quantity at unit 
wholesale price , and sells to the consumer at a new retail price . The CEM 
produces quantity and sells to the OEM at unit wholesale price . Since 
there is no quantity leftover in the supply chain, we have . We 
introduce and as the unit penalty cost of the increase and 




centralized firm model in section 6.1 followed by the decentralized model under 
different leadership in section 6.2 to 6.4. 
 
6.1 The Centralized Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand 
Function 
 
The new retail price  from the actual market demand in equation (16) can be 
written as   
 
The centralized supply chain optimization problem now becomes    
 
where  is the new total supply chain profit and . 
We propose two constraints:  
 when :  the production quantity cannot be decreased 




 when :  the production quantity cannot be increased 
when the actual demand is less than originally planned. 
 
6.1.1 Actual demand is more than originally planned ( ) 
 
Since  or , the centralized supply chain profit function (18) now 
becomes 
 
We calculate the new optimum quantity using the first order condition as in 
equation (2) and compare with the original optimum quantity from equation (5): 
 
 
We proposed earlier the constraint  when , but we see that  will 
be less than  if . We have two cases with regard to the value of 
 in equation (20): 
 




When this condition is true, satisfies the constraint  when , 
implying that is indeed maximized at . We calculate the new optimum 
retail price from equation (17) and the maximum profit of the centralized 
supply chain from equation (19), and compare with the optimum solution 
in the linear demand function in equation (5): 
 
 
The increase in the consumer demand results in the optimum solution that is 
higher than the original one. 
 
Case 2:   
When this condition is true, does not satisfy the constraint  
when , implying that is indeed maximized at . This implies that 
the original production plan should not be changed  unless the 
magnitude of demand disruption is large enough (greater than ). 
However, the retail price can be increased following the new demand 
function. We calculate the new optimum retail price from equation (17) and 
the maximum profit of the centralized supply chain from equation (19), and 





Although the quantity sold is the same as the originally planned, the retail price 
can be increased and hence, the profit will increase as well. 
 
6.1.2 Actual demand is less than originally planned ( ) 
 
Since  or , the centralized supply chain profit function (18) now 
becomes 
 
We calculate the new optimum quantity using the first order condition as in 
equation (2) and compare with the original optimum quantity from equation (5): 
 
Similar to section 6.1.1, we see that the value of  may be greater than  
if . We have two cases with regard to the additive term in 
equation (24): 
 




When this condition is true, does not satisfy the constraint  
when . This implies that the original production plan should not be 
changed  unless the magnitude of demand disruption is large 
enough (greater than ). The optimum solution of case 3 is exactly the 
same as case 2 equation (22). The quantity sold is the same as the originally 
planned but the retail price should be decreased to achieve maximum profit 
(which is still less than the optimum profit in the linear demand function). 
 
Case 4:   
When this condition is true, satisfies the constraint  when , 
implying that is indeed maximized at . We calculate the new optimum 
retail price from equation (17) and the maximum profit of the centralized 
supply chain from equation (19), and compare with the optimum solution 
in equation (5): 
 
 
The decrease in the consumer demand results in the optimum solution that is 





6.2 The Decentralized Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand 
Function 
 
We consider a decentralized supply chain with OEM as the leader. Applying the 
actual demand from equation (16) and the new retail price from equation (17), 
the profit maximization problem at the Retailer in equation (18) now becomes  
 
where                               (26) 
. 
We apply the same two constraints as were given earlier for the centralized 
supply chain in section 6.1. 
 
6.2.1. Actual demand is more than originally planned ( ) 
 









We can rewrite equation (28) in terms of  from equation (11): 
 
 
Equation (29) shows that constraint  alone is not sufficient, because it 
does not guarantee that . We will now investigate two cases, as before. 
 
Case 1:   
When this condition is true,  satisfies the constraint . 
Following the similar procedure as in the case of the decentralized model with 
no demand disruptions, we have the following optimum solutions: 
    
     






   
Using this result, the constraint   also can be 
written as . 
       
Case 2:   or   
When this condition is true,  does not satisfy the constraint . There is 
no feasible solution for equation (27). The original production plan should not 
be increased ( ) and all other CEM and OEM optimum parameters are 
the same as in the decentralized model with no demand disruption – see 
equations (6), (10), and (11). On the other hand, the Retailer always has a 
chance to increase the retail price as long as it satisfies the linear demand 
function in equation (16). The new retail price is 
 
and the supply chain new profit is  





The constraint   also can be written as 
. 
 
6.2.2 Actual demand is less than originally planned ( ) 
 












Equation (35) shows that constraint  alone is not sufficient, because it 
does not guarantee that . Similar to section 6.1, we investigate two cases: 
 
Case 3:  
When this condition is true,  does not satisfy the constraint . There is 
no feasible solution for equation (33). The original production plan should not 
be decreased ( ). However, unlike in case 2, the value of  is 
negative. The Retailer has to lower the retail price to avoid the penalty cost of 
disposing the leftover quantity. 
The constraint   also can be written as 
. 
 
Case 4:  
When this condition is true,  satisfies the constraint . 
Following the similar procedure as in the case of the decentralized model with 
no demand disruptions, we have the following optimum solutions: 
    
     






The constraint  can also be written as 
. 
 
Using the same method as above, we can generalize the results for CEM 
Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg as follows: 
 
Table 7 Four different cases in stochastic demand function where i = Retailer 













     
     
     
     
     
     
     







6.3 Numerical Analysis and Discussion: Optimal Decisions and 
Profits 
 
Suppose the demand function is characterized by the market scale 
the price-sensitive coefficient  the positive coefficient of the 
product marginal cost in the centralized supply chain , and  and 
 as the unit penalty cost of the increase and decrease of production 
from the original plan respectively. The penalty cost for disposing leftover 
quantities is less than the penalty cost for producing more because we assume 
that the leftover product still can be sold to the market but at a much lower price. 
As in the previous section for the decentralized supply chain, we allocate 50% of 
the marginal cost to the CEM, 35% to the OEM, and 15% to the Retailer, or 
 and . Using the results from Table 7, we 
calculate the optimum profit under different leadership for the four possible 
cases, with  for case 1,  for case 2, -  for case 3, 






Table 8  Effect of different leadership structure on optimum parameters and 





CEM leads OEM leads 
Retailer 
leads 
 2525 870 1383 1311 
  $5485 $1384 $1312 
  $8097 $6918 $3542 






















 $13,501,250 $7,536,385 $10,556,446 $10,196,610 
η 100% 56% 78% 76% 
 
Table 9  Effect of different leadership structure on optimum parameters and 




CEM leads OEM leads 
Retailer 
leads 
 2500 862 1370 1299 
  $5431 $1370 $1299 
  $8017 $6849 $3506 






















 $12,750,000 $7,220,571 $10,082,567 $9,743,633 





Table 10 Effect of different leadership structure on optimum parameters and 





CEM leads OEM leads 
Retailer 
leads 
 2500 862 1370 1299 
  $5431 $1370 $1299 
  $8017 $6849 $3506 






















 $12,250,000 $7,048,157 $9,808,594 $9,483,893 
 100% 58% 80% 77% 
 
 
Table 11 Effect of different leadership structure on optimum parameters and 




CEM leads OEM leads 
Retailer 
leads 
 2475 853 1356 1285 
  $5377 $1356 $1286 
  $7937 $6781 $3471 






















 $11,876,250 $6,863,080 $9,542,184 $9,227,644 






In all four cases, we see that the OEM Stackelberg retains its highest optimum 
profit efficiency, just like in the original linear demand function case (Table 4). 
The impact of demand randomness to the optimum overall supply chain profit 







7. DEMAND DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT 
 
In this section, we investigate the supply chain that experiences a demand 
disruption that results in an inevitable deviation from the initial production plan. 
When actual consumer demand is higher than the forecast (positive disruption), 
overtime production and expedited delivery are required. On the other hand, 
when actual demand is lower than the forecast (negative disruption), costs for 
holding excess inventory and perhaps disposal are incurred. If not managed 
properly and timely, such deviations will severely affect the firms‟ performance in 
terms of revenue, operational efficiency, consumer satisfaction, and market 
competitiveness.  
 
Disruption management is concerned with analyzing the costs of deviating from 
existing production plans.  Our objective is to determine how to retain the supply 
chain profit by making adjustments to the production plan in the second period 
once the demand is realized. We try to maintain the original production plan as 
much as possible, because in practice, there are many significant implicit costs 
that are involved when the original plan cannot be carried out. These implicit 






We measure the effectiveness of demand disruption management through the 
changes in the supply chain profit. We analyze the penalty cost incurred when 
the actual demand deviates from the original production plan. We will reuse the 
supply chain model facing stochastic demand function from section 6. We 
consider the randomness in demand in equation (16) as the disruption to the 
base demand, which is deterministic and decreases linearly in price. We extend 
our study on disruption management to include the exponential demand function 
as the base demand. However, we are not able to derive the exact solutions 
analytically as in section 6.1 and 6.2 because the math becomes substantially 
complicated. We will adopt a numerical analysis approach and present this in 
section 7.3 and 7.4. 
 
As a baseline, we consider the production plan in the second period equals to the 
plan in the first period and the retail price remains the same. We take into 
account the consequence of not responding to the demand disruption (e.g., some 
quantities will be left unsold when the actual demand is less than the original 
plan). We apply the methods of handling the demand disruption that will generate 
the optimum profit from section 6. In the centralized model, the firm will adjust 
both production plan and the retail price if the disruption is major (beyond a 
certain threshold) and otherwise only will adjust the retail price. In the 
decentralized model, the OEM, being the leader, will make adjustment to the 




disruption is major (beyond a certain threshold).  When the demand disruption is 
minor, the OEM will keep the original production plan and the wholesale price 
policies and let the Retailer make a decision on the retail price. We label these 
methods as Optimum Disruption Management. We also investigate the situation 
where the Retailer sets the retail price independently in order to maximize own 
profit. We show that this retail price adjustment method works well only when the 
disruption is positive. We use the same penalty cost for changing the production 
plan due to the demand increase  and due to the demand decrease 
 when the base demand function is linear as well as exponential.  
 
 
7.1 Numerical Analysis and Discussion on Disruption to the 
Base Linear Demand in a Centralized Supply Chain 
 
Let the demand function is characterized by the market scale the price-
sensitive coefficient  the positive coefficient of the product marginal cost in 
the centralized supply chain . The optimal demand quantity is , the 
optimal retail price is , and the supply chain profit will be . 





Case 1: Demand Increase ( ) 
Suppose the market scale is higher than anticipated, . In the 
baseline case, the demand increase is completely ignored. There are no 
changes in the production quantity, the retail price, and the profit. However, 
from equation (4) and (16), we can see that there is an opportunity to 
increase the retail price to $1100. 
 
 
The profit now becomes 
 
-  = $225,000. 
This is an increase of 80% compared to the profit from the original production 
plan. 
 
Also from equation (4) and (16), we see that the firm has the option to sell 
more quantity with the original retail price. However, when the production plan 




numbers above, the firm profit goes to zero when the production quantity is 
increased to 450 units. 
 
Within the demand disruption context, this situation corresponds to case 1 in 
section 6.1.1 . From equation (20), we get the new 
optimal retail price  , the new production quantity is , and 
the new supply chain profit is . By acting upon the demand 
disruption, more quantity will be sold at a higher retail price and the profit will 
increase by 81%. 
 
From the results above, we see that the Optimum Disruption Management 
method in case 1 will generate more profit rather than no action at all. The 
difference in the profit increase between the retail price adjustment and the 
Optimum Disruption Management method is small (1%) when the market 
scale increases by 40%, but it grows larger with the higher market scale 
increase. For example, the Optimum Disruption Management method will 
result in 49% incremental profit compare to the retail price adjustment when 






Case 2: Demand Increase ) 
Suppose the market scale increase is 100, which corresponds to case 2 in 
section 6.1.1. This demand increase is ignored in the baseline case. Applying 
the Optimum Disruption Management, the owner retains the original 
production plan of 250 units but increases the retail price to $850. This results 
in a profit of $150,000, an increase of 20% from the baseline. The Optimum 
Disruption Management method is in fact the same with the retail price 
adjustment method in this case. 
 
Case 3 Demand Decrease  
The market scale decreases by 50, which corresponds to case 3 (
) in section 6.1.2.  When the demand decrease is ignored (baseline), 
only 200 units can be sold at $750 unit price. The profit will be $84,500 after 
$3000 penalty cost for disposing 50 leftover units.  
 
Applying the Optimum Disruption Management, the firm keeps the original 
production plan of 250 units but has to reduce the retail price to $700 to avoid 
any leftover. This results in $112,500 profit, an increase of 33% from the 
baseline. Similar with case 2, the Optimum Disruption Management method in 





Case 4 Demand Decrease  
Suppose the market scale now is lower than anticipated, . As the 
baseline, we consider the firm continues to product 250 units and to sell at the 
$750 retail price. At the end of the second period, there are 100 units left 
over. The profit is $44,000 after incurring a $6000 penalty cost of disposing 
the 100 excess units.  
 
If the firm chooses to sell all of 250 units per the original production plan and 
to lower the unit retail price to $650 per equation (4), the maximum profit will 
be $100,000, which is a 127% increase compared to the baseline. 
 
Within the demand disruption context, this situation corresponds to case 4 in 
section 6.1.2 . Applying the Optimum Disruption 
Management method, we have the optimal retail price = $660, the new 
production quantity = 240, and the new supply chain profit = $100,200. 
By acting upon the demand disruption, the owner eliminates the potential 





Similar to the demand increase in case 1, the difference in the profit increase 
between the retail price adjustment and the Optimum Disruption Management 
method is small (1%) in the analysis above, but it grows larger as the market 
scale decreases further. For example, the Optimum Disruption Management 
method will result in $24,200 profit compare to zero profit in the retail price 
adjustment when the market scale decreases by 50%. 
 
We summarize our results of the effectiveness of demand disruption 
management in Table 12. 
 
 
7.2 Numerical Analysis and Discussion on Disruption to the 
Base Linear Demand in a Decentralized Supply Chain 
 
We use the same linear demand function as in section 7.1 and assume that OEM 
is the Stackelberg leader. We allocate 50% of the product cost to the CEM, 35% 




Table 12 Effectiveness of demand disruption management in the centralized 















        
+100% 1 None (Baseline) 250 250 $750 $125,000  
+100% 1 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $1750 $375,000 +200% 
+100% 1 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 425 425 $1575 $436,250 +249% 
        
+40% 1 None (Baseline) 250 250 $750 $125,000  
+40% 1 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $1100 $225,000 +80% 
+40% 1 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 275 275 $1125 $226,250 +81% 
        
+10% 2 None (Baseline) 250 250 $750 $125,000  
+10% 2 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $850 $150,000 +20% 
+10% 2 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 250 250 $850 $150,000 +20% 
        
-5% 3 None (Baseline) 250 200 $750 $84,500  
-5% 3 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $700 $112,500 +33% 
-5% 3 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 250 250 $700 $112,500 +33% 
        
-10% 4 None (Baseline) 250 150 $750 $44,000  
-10% 4 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $650 $100,000 +127% 
-10% 4 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 240 240 $660 $100,200 +128% 
        
-50% 4 None (Baseline) 250 - $750 -  
-50% 4 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $250 $0  
-50% 4 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 140 140 $360 $24,200 +100% 
        
 
 
When there is no disruption, we can calculate using equations (10), (11), and 
(12) the supply chain total optimum profit $99,456 from selling 136 units with a 
retail price of $863. The wholesale price from the CEM to the OEM is $137, and 
from the OEM to the Retailer is $685. The OEM, being the Stackelberg leader, 





Suppose the market scale is higher than anticipated, . In the baseline 
case, the demand increase is completely ignored. There are no changes in the 
production quantity, the retail price, and the profit. However, from equation (4) 




In our price adjustment method, we assume there are no changes in the 
wholesale prices within the supply chain. The profit increase, just like the penalty 
cost, will be at the Retailer only. 
 
When we apply the Optimum Disruption Management method as in section 6.2, 
the quantity sold increases to 150 at a $1249 retail price. The new total optimum 
profit is $160,697, a 62% increase from the baseline and an 8% higher than the 
price adjustment method above. The OEM still realizes most of the profit, but its 





We apply the same logic on the four cases similar to section 7.1 and we tabulate 
the impact of managing the demand disruption in Table 13.  
 
When the demand increases but ignored, the supply chain profits for each 
member remain the same as if there is no disruption. However, the Retailer will 
have to dispose the excess inventory at the end of the second period if no action 
is taken towards the demand decreases. 
 
Applying the retail price adjustment when the disruption is positive will result in 
an increase only to the Retailer‟s profit because the wholesale price policies 
remain the same. In this situation, the Retailer chooses not to participate in the 
Stackelberg game in order to maximize own profit. We see in our numerical 
example that this method works well when the disruption is positive. However, 
this method will also penalize only the Retailer when the disruption is negative. 
The Retailer may still get some profit when the negative disruption is close to the 
threshold   (-10% in our numerical example). As the negative disruption 
grows larger, the Retailer profit quickly goes away (no profit when the market 
scale decreases by 50% in our numerical example). The retail price adjustment 
works best when the disruption is within the threshold  for positive 




Disruption Management method formulated in case 2 and case 3 in section 6.2 is 
the retail price adjustment method. 
 
The Optimum Disruption Management results in the optimum solution in case 1 
and case 4 (demand disruption exceeding the threshold). In case 1, the Retailer 
gets a bigger portion of the total supply chain profit (increase from 22% to 42%) 
when the positive disruption is relatively small (40% in our example) and is acted 
upon. The OEM, being the Stackelberg leader, still retains most of the total 
supply chain profit (>50%). As the positive disruption gets bigger, the Retailer‟s 
profit portion will shrink the as the Retailer will incur more penalty cost due to 
additional quantity to produce to the original production plan. In our analysis, the 
Retailer‟s portion shrinks from 42% to 31% of the total profit when the market 
scale increases from +40% to +100%. The Retailer‟s profit portion behaves 
similarly when the disruption is negative. When the market scale reduces by 
50%, the Retailer still gets some profit under the Optimum Disruption 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In summary, we can see that the supply chain profit in both the centralized and 
decentralized models equals the baseline if the demand disruption is positive but 
ignored. Applying Optimum Disruption Management method will maximize the 
supply chain profit. When the positive disruption is major, the production plan and 
the wholesale price policies will be adjusted, and the retail price will be 
increased. The supply chain will sell the same quantity but at a higher retail price 
when the demand disruption is positive but minor. In our numerical example, the 
management of the positive demand disruption in the centralized model results in 
higher profit increase relative to the decentralized model. 
 
When the demand disruption is negative and ignored, the supply chain will 
experience higher financial damage in the decentralized model. In our numerical 
example, the profit decrease in the major negative disruption case is twice the 
decrease in the minor negative case for both the centralized and decentralized 
models. In the decentralized model, the Retailer enjoys greater benefit from 







7.3 Numerical Analysis and Discussion on Disruption to the 
Base Exponential Demand in a Centralized Supply Chain 
 
Suppose the base exponential demand function is characterized by market scale 
 1.05 × 1011, demand elasticity  3, and marginal cost coefficient  1. 
From Table 5, we calculate the optimal centralized supply chain profit of 
$125,000, which is obtained by selling 250 units at a retail price of $750. 
 
Let  1 be the demand disruption. The actual demand  realized in the 
second period can be expressed in the new deterministic demand function 
. The centralized supply chain optimization problem now 
becomes    
 
where  is the new total supply chain profit and .  
 






The optimum quantity  that maximizes the profit can be derived from the first 
order condition of equation (38): 
 
As can be seen from equation (39), the math becomes much too complicated to 
find the exact solutions analytically. We will adopt a numerical analysis approach 
to find the optimum quantity  when the base demand is exponential. In the rest 
of this section and next, we will present the constraints in a similar flavor those of 
the linear demand function in the previous sections. 
 
The root of the nonlinear equation (39) will give the optimum quantity  that 
maximizes the centralized supply chain profit. However,  can be of any value 
and not necessarily satisfy the constraint . We apply the following 







Suppose the optimum quantity  is infinitely close to the originally planned , 
or . Equation (39) becomes: 
 
 
We apply the similar procedure for the negative disruption and we have 
 
Similar to the threshold parameter  in section 6, these  will determine 
whether the disruption is major (case 1 and 4) or minor (case 2 and 3). 
 
Suppose the market scale increases by 400% (  5) and the penalty costs for 
the demand disruption are the same with section 7.1 and 7.2. From equation 
(40), we know that this disruption belongs to case 1. We use numerical analysis 
of the Newton Method to find the roots of equation (39). We calculate  using 
the formula: 
 






For the initial value , we use the optimum quantity of the base demand 250. 
After two iterations, we obtain  267 as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 14 Summary of Newton's Method. 
     
1 250 54.99 -3.14 17.51 
2 267.51 0.88 -3.04 0.29 
 
 
We use a similar procedure to calculate the optimum quantity for the different 
constraint cases. As in section 7.1, we calculate the retail price and the firm‟s 
profit for the Optimum Disruption Management method and the retail price 
adjustment method and tabulated the results in table 15. 
 
In general, we have similar results with the disruption when the base demand is 
linear in section 7.1. Total profit is higher when the demand disruption is 
managed, using Optimum Disruption Management method as well as retail price 
adjustment method. The profit difference between retail price adjustment and 




small relative to the threshold. However, the Optimum Disruption Management 
clearly results in higher profit as the demand disruption gets bigger. When the 
demand decreases by 90% (disruption parameter  0.1), the Retailer will still 
get profit of $33,649 under Optimum Disruption Management method compared 
to $24,530 under the price adjustment method. 
 
Table 15 Effectiveness of demand disruption management in the centralized supply 
chain when the base demand is exponential. 
Disruption 
Parameter 











        
10 1 None (Baseline) 250 250 $750 $125,000  
10 1 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $1616 $341,457 +173% 
10 1 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 337 337 $1463 $353,272 +183% 
        
5 1 None (Baseline) 250 250 $750 $125,000  
5 1 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $1282 $258,120 +106% 
5 1 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 267 267 $1255 $258,606 +107% 
        
2 2 None (Baseline) 250 250 $750 $125,000  
2 2 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $945 $173,735 +39% 
2 2 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 250 250 $945 $173,735 +39% 
        
0.8 3 None (Baseline) 250 200 $750 $84,500  
0.8 3 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $696 $111,560 +32% 
0.8 3 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 250 250 $696 $111,560 +32% 
        
0.6 4 None (Baseline) 250 150 $750 $44,000  
0.6 4 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $633 $95,644 +117% 
0.6 4 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 242 242 $639 $95,708 +118% 
        
0.1 4 None (Baseline) 250 25 $750 −  
0.1 4 Ret. Price Adj. 250 250 $348 $24,530 +100% 
0.1 4 Opt. Disr. Mgmt. 163 163 $401 $33,649 +137% 






7.4 Numerical Analysis and Discussion on Disruption to the 
Base Exponential Demand in a Decentralized Supply Chain 
Using the same procedure as in section 7.3, we obtain the following threshold 
parameters when the demand increases 
 
and when the demand decreases 
 
 
We use numerical analysis of Newton Method from equation (42). When the 
demand disruption is positive, we have 
 






For the decentralized model, we use the same cost allocation as for linear 
demand. When there is no demand disruption (baseline), profit is maximized by 
selling 126 units at a retail price of $942. The OEM, being the Stackelberg 
leader, has the larger share of the profit (51%) followed by the Retailer (41%) 
and the CEM (8%). We apply the same logic for the different cases of the 
demand disruption as in the previous sections. The results are tabulated in Table 
16.  
 
We find in our example that when the demand is exponential, the initial 
production plan in the decentralized model is more robust to a demand disruption 
than the centralized model. From equations (42) and (43), the initial production 
plan in the decentralized model should not be changed unless the market scale 
increases more than 406% or decreases more than 37% compared to 310% or 
32% in the centralized model. 
 
Similar to the results from the previous sections, the profit is higher when the 
demand disruption is managed. The supply chain profit is maximized under 
Optimum Disruption Management method when the disruption is relatively big 
compared to the threshold. However, we see that the OEM‟s share of the profit 
under Optimum Disruption Management method becomes lower than the 




contract does not work very well for the Stackelberg leader and another 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this dissertation, we have investigated the impact of the different leadership in 
a two-period, three-tier decentralized electronics supply chain consisting of a 
CEM, an OEM and a Retailer.  Specifically, we focus on the impact on the profit 
of the individual supply chain member as well as of the overall supply chain. We 
began our study with a centralized model where the CEM, OEM, and Retailer are 
all within one firm. We then extended these results to a decentralized model 
governed by a wholesale price contract. We apply the Stackelberg solution 
concept, whose central theme lies in the assumption that the leader, occupying 
the higher level of hierarchy, can choose his strategy to optimize his operation by 
taking into account the rational reactions of followers. Three different demand 
functions are used, i.e. linear, exponential, and stochastic.  
 
In the decentralized model with linear demand, the highest optimum profit will be 
achieved when the supply chain is led by the Retailer and the unit cost is shared 
only between the CEM and the Retailer, followed by the supply chain led by the 
OEM with the unit cost is shared only between the CEM and the OEM. Retailer 
Stackelberg supply chain is most profitable when 50% or less of the unit cost is 
absorbed by the CEM, and OEM Stackelberg supply chain is most profitable 




greater share of the profit in the CEM Stackelberg supply chain, followed by the 
next supply chain member (OEM-Retailer). The OEM has also the greater share 
of the profit in the OEM Stackelberg supply chain, followed by the next supply 
chain member (Retailer-CEM). However, this is not the case with Retailer 
Stackelberg supply chain (Retailer-OEM-CEM). 
 
When the demand is exponential, the highest optimum profit is achieved when a 
powerful Retailer leads the supply chain and the product unit cost is allocated 
between the CEM and the Retailer only. Based on our numerical analysis, the 
CEM Stackelberg will be most profitable when the CEM unit cost is between 20% 
and 71% of the total product unit cost, and the OEM Stackelberg will have the 
highest profit when more than 71% of the product unit cost is absorbed by the 
CEM. The profit distribution of the Retailer Stackelberg and the OEM Stackelberg 
supply chains are similar to the linear demand case. Unlike in the linear demand 
case, the Retailer profit in the CEM Stackelberg may be higher than the OEM 
depending on the product unit cost distribution. 
 
In the stochastic demand function, we model demand randomness as additive 
disruption in the linear demand function. We show in our numerical analysis that 
the addition of demand randomness has minimal impact to the optimum overall 
supply chain profit efficiency under different leadership structures when the 




demand randomness in the two-period model indeed does not impact the overall 
supply chain profit efficiency. 
 
Using the same supply chain model, we also have investigated the impact of 
demand disruption when the production plan can no longer be executed as 
originally formulated. In the first period, the CEM creates a production plan based 
on the forecast of market demand. The actual demand is realized at the Retailer 
in the second period.  
 
We began our study with a centralized model where the CEM, OEM, and Retailer 
are all within one firm. We then extended these results to a decentralized model 
governed by a wholesale price contract. Our modeling and analysis approaches 
are applicable to both linear and exponential demand functions.  
 
A penalty cost is incurred when a demand disruption necessitates an increase or 
decrease in production from the original plan. Additional production requires 
more expensive resources such as overtime labor, and in this case we show that 
the supply chain can generate more profit if the demand increase is properly 
managed. In the case when actual demand is less than the initial plan, the supply 
chain may have to dispose or sell the leftover inventory to a secondary market, 
and disruption management can minimize the reduction in supply chain profit. 
We also show that in some cases it is more profitable for the supply chain to 





When the demand disruption occurs in the decentralized model with linear 
demand and is managed using the Optimum Disruption Management method, 
the OEM as the Stackelberg leader retains the larger share of the supply chain 
profit. However, this is not always true when the demand disruption occurs in the 
decentralized model with exponential demand. Further study is required to 
determine if the wholesale price contract indeed does not work in favor of the 
Stackelberg leader in the case of disruptions with exponential demand.  
 
There are several directions in which our work can be extended. We have 
assumed that there is only one leader in the supply chain. One extension to our 
model would be where there are several competing players in each supply chain 
tiers and multiple leaders. A second direction would be to consider the supply 
disruption where the Retailer is the Stackelberg leader, which corresponds to 
situations where major big box retailers gain greater power in the supply chain 
than the OEMs. A third direction that would be interesting would be to consider 
an extension to the wholesale price contract, such as a revenue sharing contract, 
buy-back contract, etc. Finally, it would be interesting to apply robust optimization 
techniques in the model. Closed-form expressions of key parameters can be 
derived and will provide a deeper insight into the effect of leadership in the 
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